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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE EURO AND COMPETITION IN EUROPEAN FINANCIAL
MARKETS
1 INTRODUCTION
Only a short period of time away from the date at which the decision will be
taken to start the Economic and Monetary Union ~EMU!, the debate in the ﬁ-
nancial press and in academic circles is still very much focused on the issue of
the desirability of starting EMU in 1999. Much of the discussion is concerned
with the question whether a sufficient degree of convergence has been achieved
among the candidate member states and whether monetary union should not be
preceded by political union. The debate is overshadowed by the concern that the
euro might not be sufficiently strong, if from its start the EMU is going to in-
clude a large number of countries.
With eyes and minds focused on the decisions to be taken in 1998 and on
practical aspects of the introduction of new currency, it is not surprising to see
little research addressing the question of the role of the euro as an international
currency and its implications for European ﬁnancial markets. Fortunately, the situ-
ation is changing. Recently, the Royal Netherlands Economic Association com-
missioned a study on the euro in a broader perspective ~see Jager ~1997a!!. The
recent paper by Alogoskouﬁs, Portes, and Rey ~1997! deals with the position of
the euro as an international currency. McCauley and White ~1997! from the Bank
of International Settlements in Basle investigate the possible implications of the
euro for European bond markets and for the European banking system. The pa-
per by Pagano ~1997! studies recent changes in the microstructure of European
equity markets. The papers by Alogoskouﬁs et al. and by Pagano were presented
at the European Summer Institute 1997 ~ESI! organized by K. Koedijk and S.
Eijffinger at the Humboldt University in Berlin. The topics are of sufficient inter-
est for academic researchers and policymakers to devote some discussion to them.
In this communication I shall review the contributions in the papers by Alog-
oskouﬁs et al. ~1997!, McCauley and White ~1997! and Pagano ~1997! on the
position of the euro in relationship with likely developments in European ﬁnan-
cial markets. As the issues studied are closely interrelated, it is appropriate to
discuss them in an integrated framework. I shall start with reviewing the theo-
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ings in the three papers mentioned above. I shall establish links between the top-
ics addressed in these papers and give some reﬂections on the current state of the
research and on issues that in my view are of importance and request further
research.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
McCauley and White ~1997! argue that the introduction of the euro will elimi-
nate exchange rate risk and create a transparent single bond market, whereas Pa-
gano ~1997! states that the monetary union will encourage investors to hold more
diversiﬁed equity portfolios leading to increased cross-border trading.
As euro ﬁnancial markets develop and become deeper and more liquid, the
transactions volume will rise and transactions costs will fall under the pressure of
increased competition. Euro assets become more attractive and the role of the
euro as a vehicle currency is strengthened. In Alogoskouﬁs et al. ~1997!, the de-
velopment of euro ﬁnancial markets and market thickness externalities are the
main determinants of the position of the euro as an international currency. To
illustrate the potential of the euro as an international currency, notice that the
share in the world trade of the largest EU countries with non-EU trade partners
is approximately 15%. The role of these countries’ currencies as transaction cur-
rencies is commensurate with this ﬁgure. For the US dollar a similar ﬁgure holds
for the share of world trade, but its share as a transaction currency is 50% of
world trade ~see e.g. Duisenberg ~1996!!. Synergy between the increased role of
the euro as a vehicle currency and the increased attractiveness of European ﬁ-
nancial markets will further strengthen the international position of the euro.
In short, lower entry barriers and costs result in increased depth, transparency
and liquidity of European ﬁnancial markets. Complemented with technological
changes in the mode of execution of transactions, these developments will exert
competitive pressure on margins and transactions costs and through this foster
the attractiveness of the euro and European ﬁnancial markets.
3 THE EURO AS AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY
The achievement of the Alogoskouﬁs et al. ~1997! paper is an evaluation of the
potential of the euro to become an international currency and an assessment of
the welfare effects of different scenarios using a general equilibrium model. The
framework used is that of a tripolar world with three main currencies, being the
US dollar, the euro, and the Japanese yen. The authors assume that there will be
a wide euro, including the UK, and that the euro will be a credible currency. The
scenarios vary from the status quo where the start of the EMU does not have an
impact on the international monetary order, the quasi-status quo in which the euro
replaces the dollar as a dominant currency for transactions between Europe and
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cial asset transactions but trade between the dollar and the Asian bloc remaining
denominated in dollars, the big euro scenario corresponding to the previous sce-
nario with in addition the euro becoming the vehicle currency for some transac-
tions between the dollar and yen, and ﬁnally the paneuro scenario which goes
beyond the big euro scenario in that all transactions between the dollar and the
yen are intermediated through the euro.
The transaction costs structure after the start of EMU is derived and used to
determine which scenarios are beneﬁcial and therefore likely to arise. Current
measures of transactions costs in foreign exchange markets, an elasticity of trans-
actions costs with respect to volume of 20.03 ~see Hartmann ~1996!! and esti-
mated volumes after the start of the EMU under each of the above scenarios are
used to estimate transactions costs for each scenario. Similarly for ﬁnancial mar-
kets the bid-ask spreads on 10 year bonds and an elasticity of transactions costs
with respect to volumes of 20.11 ~see Tagaki ~1987!! are used to obtain the
transactions costs structure after the start of EMU.
The analysis by Alogoskouﬁs et al. ~1997! indicates that the most likely sce-
narios are the status quo or the quasi-status quo although other scenarios cannot
a priori be ruled out. The authors conclude that world welfare is maximized in
the medium euro case, whereas obviously for Europe the big euro scenario is the
preferred one. The estimated welfare gains for the status quo and the big euro
case vary from 0.5% to 1.0% of GDP per year for Europe and a loss between
0.4% and 0.8% for the US, and of less than 0.1% for Japan. These changes in
welfare result from changes in the efficiency in transactions. Other gains such as
due to increased seigniorage for Europe are not taken into account. They were
estimated to be of limited size ~a ﬂow of less than 0.1% of GDP! by Alogosk-
ouﬁs and Portes ~1991!. Alogoskouﬁs et al. ~1997! conclude that the price for the
increased international role of the euro is an appreciation of its value relative to
the major competitors, the US dollar and the Japanese yen.
4 THE EURO AND EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKETS
McCauley and White ~1997! start by observing that European-based ﬁnancial in-
stitutions are already under signiﬁcant competitive pressure to restructure. This
pressure will be intensiﬁed by existing forces of technological change and de-
regulation affecting cross-border activity ~the First and Second Banking Direc-
tives of the European Commission!. In their views, the euro is likely to become
a catalist for change that will play a major role in establishing a large liquid
security market in Europe, both for private and public securities. The bond mar-
ket in euros is likely to attract more international investment and more issuance
in that currency at the expense of bank loans. As a result the international posi-
tion of the euro will be enhanced. McCauley ~1997! established that a realloca-
tion of private portfolios from the US dollar to the euro such that the euro share
349 COMMUNICATIONSof international assets matches the output and trade shares of the G-10 members
of the European Union requires a shift of US $ 0.7 trillion. The elimination of
currency risk within Europe will increase the attractiveness of euro-denominated
securities. Portfolios of institutional investors are expected to reduce their bias
towards home-country assets. Commercial papers and bonds will become an at-
tractive alternative to bank loans and deposits, thereby gradually shifting the role
of commercial banks from acquiring deposits and making loans to underwriting
and distributing securities. According to the authors, the direct inﬂuence of the
euro in stimulating international competition among banks for traditional kinds of
business is of less importance. Markets will remain partly segmented due to the
existence of different legal, ﬁscal and regulatory factors, despite the increased
pressure for more harmonization. The process of disintermediation is expected to
have a more important impact on the banking sector than the loss of net revenues
derived from foreign exchange and increased costs resulting from the introduc-
tion of the euro during a transition period.
The authors discuss potential issues for public policy in Europe and elsewhere
that arise from the competitive challenges faced by European banks. The authors
point to the importance of adequate incentive structures and supervisory arrange-
ments to promote sound banking. Given the integration of ﬁnancial markets, ad-
justment problems are likely to have spillover effects beyond the European Union.
The issue of systemic risk within Europe will have to be addressed in a way that
is consistent with that adopted elsewhere. The authors also point out that the de-
velopment of deep and liquid euro bond markets could weaken the currency con-
cerned. For instance, if new securities were to be issued in euro and the proceeds
used to buy in debt in US dollars, investors would have to be induced to hold
more euro and fewer dollar assets. This could result in higher euro interest rates
and possibly a weaker euro.
Many of the points discussed by McCauley and White ~1997! are also empha-
sized by Pagano ~1997!, who describes how increased competition between Eu-
ropean stock exchanges has reduced trading costs and extended the variety of
trading mechanisms. He illustrates the convergence among European stock ex-
changes towards a common dualistic structure, formed by an automated order
driven auction system specializing in small and medium-sized trades and a mar-
ket-making dealer market for large trades. The author discusses likely future de-
velopments. Several factors are mentioned, among which the regulatory changes
resulting from the EU Investment Services Directive, the increased importance of
proprietary trading systems, the pressure of institutional investors to narrow bro-
kers’ margins and the start of the monetary union will all increase competition
among security exchanges and trading systems. The introduction of a single cur-
rency will eliminate exchange rate risk and lead to cross-border diversiﬁcation of
equity portfolios. National stock exchanges will have to compete for European
and foreign investors with alternative trading systems ~e.g. direct access to insti-
tutional investors! and cheap execution of orders. According to Pagano ~1997!
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issuing companies and induce more European companies to go public.
To summarize, the elimination of exchange risk, the increased depth, liquidity
and transparency of European bond and stock markets are expected to lead to
increased competition and lower transactions costs as a result of the introduction
of a single currency. The likely expansion of bond markets will partly result from
reduced intermediation by commercial banks. The banking sector and security
markets in Europe are expected to face major challenges and big changes trig-
gered by the start of the EMU and important changes in the technology of trad-
ing systems.
5 COMMENTS
The thoughtful studies by Alogoskouﬁs et al., McCauley and White, and Pagano
outline likely major developments in the international position of the euro, i.e. in
the foreign exchange market for the euro, the European bond market in relation-
ship with changes in the banking sector, and the European equity markets, re-
spectively. Any quantitative assessment of these expected developments should
be taken with great care. The uncertainty surrounding estimates of these types of
developments is simply very large. There is uncertainty about membership and
size of the EMU, about its exchange rate policy, about exchange rate arrange-
ments with EU but non-EMU member states and with EU membership candidate
countries, about the ~re!action of the US and Japan after the start of EMU. Other
required adjustments contribute to the uncertainty in the transition period. After
the start of EMU total reserves held by the ESCB ~European System of Central
Banks! are likely to be reduced. Private holdings of euros might be reduced as
well, to the extent that these cash balance holdings result from converting hold-
ings in other ESCB currencies used for intra-union transactions. These adjust-
ments will take place at the beginning of the monetary union. There is also un-
certainty about the speed with which increased competition will lead to a
reduction of transaction costs, the emergence of deep and liquid bond and equity
markets and the shift from bank loans to bond debt, although the fact that the
changes in European equity markets described by Pagano ~1997! took only a de-
cade to materialize indicates that the events could gain momentum rather quickly.
In line with the study by Alogoskouﬁs et al. ~1997!, a theoretical and empiri-
cal analysis by Jager ~1997b! of the international position of the euro in the post-
transition period also concludes that the likely outcome is the status quo sce-
nario. An empirical analysis of the evolution over the period 1980–1995 of the
share of European currencies in the distribution of world bank loans, interna-
tional bonds offerings and foreign currency reserves, respectively, is used as sup-
port for the conclusion that for some time the international role of the euro will
be at most equivalent to that of the US dollar.
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~1997!, and Pagano ~1997! exhibit likely trends that will shape euro money and
ﬁnancial markets, they also point to a number of important policy issues that
deserve attention from policymakers and the economics research profession. I
shall brieﬂy discuss some of these issues.
The start of a wide EMU will lead to an international monetary order with
three global players. The international role of the euro will challenge the US dol-
lar’s dominance. The European Central Bank ~ECB! may resist the international-
ization of the euro because of the resulting pressures for an appreciation of the
euro. Also, the external stability might become of less importance to the EMU as
the share in world trade of the union is much lower than the shares of its mem-
ber states because intra-union trade will become truly domestic trade for the euro-
area. Finally, the ECB is expected to pursue its objective of price stability. To
achieve this objective, it will have to build a reputation of being tough on inﬂa-
tion. The external position of the euro might thereby get much less attention. The
ECB may even follow the example of the Bundesbank and resist to intervene in
foreign exchange markets if the measures required to assure external stability
threaten the internal stability of the euro. One also has to realize that policy co-
ordination with the non-EMU countries and exchange rate management is at the
discretion of the Council of Ministers. According to the Maastricht Treaty ~1992!,
article 109, 2, ‘These general orientations @of the Council of Ministers for ex-
change rate policy# shall be without prejudice to the primary objective of the
ESCB to maintain price stability.’ ~Italics added!. Notice that the ambiguity in
the Treaty about the internal coordination between the ECB and the Council is
yet another source of uncertainty ~see also Kenen ~1995!, chapter 5 on this point!.
The economic beneﬁts from currency dominance ~efficiency gains, seignior-
age, balance of payment, deﬁcit ﬁnancing, and absence of exchange rate risk for
currency transactions, etc.! might be sufficiently important to lead to a confron-
tation with the US about hegemony. Although the introduction of the euro will
potentially lead to more symmetry between the US and Europe, it is also likely
that exchange rate instability will increase, a prediction made by Kenen ~1995, p.
123! as well. This instability might result from the increased uncertainty about
the size, impact, and exchange rate policy of the EMU ~this policy will be sub-
ordinated to the monetary policy of the ECB! and the expected shifts in money
and ﬁnancial asset holdings in the period of transition and, more permanently,
from the structure of world foreign exchange markets. In fact, the international
monetary system will change from a unipolar regime with a de facto monopoly
of the US dollar as a major reserve currency to a multipolar regime in the form
of a quasi-oligopoly of several reserve currencies.
In the light of my comments on the uncertainty regarding external policies of
the EMU and the strategic issues involved, Jager’s ~1997b! conclusion that ex-
ternal stability of the euro is likely to occur is rather optimistic. Three arguments
are put forward to motivate this conclusion. First, the stability of the external
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currency to the euro. Second, exchange rate policy of the EMU will not be handi-
capped by the asymmetric effects that often hindered that of the EMS when a
movement of the US dollar rate had opposite effects on the D-Mark and other
weaker EMS currencies. Third, it is argued that the EMU is more likely to fulﬁll
the conditions for an optimal currency area ~similarity of economic structure, ﬂex-
ibility of wages, mobility of production factors, etc.! with the rest of the world
than the EU with different currencies. In Jager’s view, this should foster the ex-
ternal stability of the euro. These three arguments certainly have some relevance,
but as mentioned above there are sufficient reasons to be sceptical about the ex-
ternal stability of the euro.
An analysis of these strategic issues naturally requests a game-theoretic ap-
proach. The lessons that can be learned from history, for instance from studying
the rivalry about hegemony between the pound sterling and the US dollar in the
interwar period as done by Alogoskouﬁs et al. ~1997!, are of some but limited
relevance for the current situation. History suggests that the international mon-
etary system was more stable when it was dominated by one economic power
~see Eichengreen ~1989! and Gross and Thygesen ~1992!!. According to Eichen-
green ~1989! stability results when the dominant power has an incentive to pro-
vide it, e.g. when the position of the dominant power is such that its decisions
affect the equilibrium in the global market.
The issues at stake are of signiﬁcant importance for policymaking. Further
theoretical and empirical research is needed to better understand the stability and
welfare issues and to quantify the welfare gains and losses involved in various
strategies. Simulations by Dellas ~1997! using a stochastic general equilibrium
model suggest that for a given operating procedure of the central banks monetary
union contributes to lower real interest rates and lower exchange rate volatility
because the volatility of output in the union is expected to be smaller than that of
the individual countries. Operating procedures by central banks appear to matter
a great deal for exchange rates. For instance, price rate targeting which counters
velocity shocks is found to lead to more stable exchange rates than money tar-
geting. Any welfare calculation should take into account the economic conse-
quences of increased external instability and exchange rate volatility if the euro
is going to play an active role as an international currency. The Alogoskouﬁs et
al. ~1997! paper is an important contribution in that respect. It needs to be
complemented by an analysis of the strategic aspects of the problem.
The major changes in the European ﬁnancial markets and banking sector dis-
cussed by McCauley and White ~1997! and Pagano ~1997! are of concern to pub-
lic policy as well. Systemic stability of the ﬁnancial system could be threatened
seriously. Gains to the society from a more efficient allocation of funds to invest-
ment projects could in the short run be partly erased by the costs of fast restruc-
turing and possible downsizing of the banking sector.
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ence of the practice of state bailouts of banks with sound banking practice, the
difficulties of organizing a bailout of large EU-wide operating banks, increased
deposit competition on the basis of different deposit insurance regimes, sufficient
diversiﬁcation of sovereign debt risk ~currently held by national banks and pen-
sion funds!, the problem of information-sharing in a system with national super-
visory authorities, and the design of an effective supervisory system for a largely
integrated market of banking activities requiring a system-wide response.
The principles of home country control and mutual recognition laid down in
the second banking directive and implying that only a single banking license is
required for banks operating in the European Union will have to be comple-
mented by some form of host country supervision or joint control by home and
host country authorities as long as national authorities bear the responsibility for
national and foreign banks operating domestically ~see e.g. Dermine ~1990! on
this point!.
Another problem is the course to be taken by the process of disintermediation
mentioned by McCauley and White ~1997!. For instance Masera ~1994, p. 23!
states ‘... the description of the US model as market-oriented, with a declining
role for intermediaries, and more advanced and efficient than the European model
is simplistic.’ ~See also the comparison of intermediaries and ﬁnancial markets in
Germany and the US by Allen and Gale!. In his view the process of disinterme-
diation in the US should be better called a process of diversiﬁcation of the forms
of intermediation with a growing role for non-bank intermediaries. Europe could
take a different course with the banking sector taking up the challenge caused by
the increased tendency of direct dealings between savers and ﬁnal investors
through markets. Competitive complementarity results on the one hand from the
decreased costs of market transactions on ﬁnancial markets and, on the other
hand, from the speciﬁc role of ﬁnancial intermediaries in resolving the informa-
tional asymmetry between savers and borrowers. This complementarity justiﬁes
the simultaneous existence of markets and ﬁnancial intermediaries in providing
ﬁnancial products. As in Europe banks are also allowed to act as investment banks
~universal banks! primarily linking institutional investors and issuers of securi-
ties, banks have the opportunity to address the challenge of the expected shift in
the form of intermediation in the wake of the introduction of the single currency.
The recent wave of mergers and take-overs in the European ﬁnancial sector in-
dicates that European banks are willing to face this challenge.
As documented by Pagano ~1997!, European equity markets have already taken
up the challenge and are engaged in a process of competition, converging into a
dualistic structure of an automated auction system which runs parallel to a deal-
ership market for large trades. The question whether there is a prospect for local
ﬁnancial markets in this dualistic structure has recently been addressed by Boot
~1997!, in particular for the Amsterdam Exchanges. The answer to this question
is moderately positive. Boot emphasizes that the local ﬁnancial markets can be
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cessing information on companies and markets in their vicinity.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this note I reviewed and commented upon recent studies on the role of the
euro as an international currency and its role as a catalist of signiﬁcant changes
in the European ﬁnancial sector. The process of deregulation and technological
developments in trading systems will be ampliﬁed by the introduction of the euro
which adds transparency and depth and therefore exerts competitive pressure on
margins and transactions costs and fosters the attractiveness of the euro and of
European ﬁnancial markets. Because of the increased attractiveness of European
ﬁnancial markets, the status quo scenario is rather unlikely in the longer run. Also,
it is similarly unlikely that the increased attractiveness of the euro and European
ﬁnancial markets will not challenge the US, Japan and other parts of the world to
respond. The result will be ongoing competition in a multipolar ﬁnancial world
that could have major implications for economic growth and welfare in the dif-
ferent parts of the world.
Quantifying the likely developments and making reliable projections for the
future are difficult. Uncertainty surrounding future developments is still high.
Straightforward extrapolation of trends in ﬁnancial data is deemed to be defec-
tive. One has to rely on a careful analysis and deep understanding of the strate-
gic issues involved and the interests at stake. The authors of the papers discussed
have made important contributions. The issues are of sufficient signiﬁcance to
justify further research efforts in these directions.
F.C. Palm*
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